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LAW GOVERNING THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS 
Notwithstanding the above array of authorities, both; continental 
and Anglo-American, in support of the intention theory, it is open to 
serious criticism, so far as it is applied to the intrinsic validity of 
contracts. 
"Wide as the operation necessarily is which is given to the intention 
of the parties to a contract," says Foote, 58 "it is plain that it can have no 
effect upon the question of the legality or illegality of the thing 
contracted for. No law can permit itself to be evaded, nor can it, 
consistently with the principles of international jurisprudence, sanction 
the evasion of a foreign law. Thus, if the thing contracted to be done 
is illegaJ by the law of the place of the intended performance, the 
contract should be held void; wherever it was actually entered into, by 
all courts alike." 
Foote concludes, therefore, that· the legality of a contract depends 
generally upon the law of the place of intended performance, but that 
the legality of the making of the agreement, i. e., giving a particular 
consideration for a particular promise, is controlled by the lex loci 
actus.89 
Professor M-inor also rejects the intention theory in its application 
to the validity of contracts. He would determine everything relating 
to the validity of the contract by the law of the place :where it is made; 
*Continued from the April number, 30 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 565. 
88 Foote, Private International Jurisprudence. (4th ed., 1914.), 358-359. 
10 Foote, op. cit., 359-363. 
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everything relating to the performance of the contract, by the law of the 
place of performance; and the legality or sufficiency of the considera-
tion, by the law of the situs of the consideration.90 
The most vigorous opponent of the intention theory is Professor 
Beale.91 
"The fundamental objection to this," he says, "in point of theory, is 
that· it involves permission to the parties to do a legislative act. It prac-
tically makes a legislative body of. any two persons who ~hoose ~o get 
together and contract. The adopt10n of .a rule to determme which of 
several systems of law shall govern a given transaction is in itself an act 
of the law." 
Professor Dicey admits the force of the criticism just stated, but, 
seeks, nevertheless, to justify the intention theory. In Rule 151 he 
summarizes what he conceives to be the English law on the subject as 
follows: "The essential validity of a contract is (subject to the exctep-
"tions hereinafter mentioned) governed indirectly by the proper law of 
"the contract." By the proper law of the contract Dicey means "the 
"law or laws by which the parties to a contract intended, or may 
"fairly be presumed to have intended, the contract to. be governed; or 
" (in other words) the l~w or laws to which the parties intended, or may 
"fairly be presumed to have iiJ.tended, to submit themselves." 
"This theory," says Dicey/2 "is consistent not only with the language 
of English judges, -hut, what is of more consequence, with their mode 
of thought. They hold that a contract is governed by the law of the 
country with which it has the most substantial connection, or, to put 
the matter shortly, to which it belongs, i.e., that an English contract 
is governed by English law, an American contract by American law, and 
so forth. But when we ask what is the circumstance which in the 
main determines what is the country to which a contract belongs, 
we find .that it is the intention of the parties, or, in other words, we are 
bfought round again to the conclusion that the essential validity of a 
contract is in the main determined by the proper law thereof. We can 
now see what is the real meaning of English judges when they decline, 
as they often most rightly do, to be bound by any hard and fast rule 
as tp the law governing the construction or validity of a contract. 
They do not intend to question the principle that a contract is governed 
by the law or laws to which the parties intended to submit themselves, 
but do intend to express the perfectly sound doctrine that in ascertaining 
"-;hat this intended law is, a Court ought to take into account every 
circumstance of the case, and ·ought not to be tied down to any rigid 
presumption that the parties must have intended to be bound by a 
particular law, whether it be the lex 'loci celebrationis or the·lez loci 
solutionis. . . ' 
"The proper law of a contract,· it may be objected is the law chosen 
~y the pa~ties and intended by them to govern the ~ontract. If, then, 
It may be argued, the proper law of a contract determines its essential 
00 Minor, Conflict of Laws (190!) 401-402. 
01 (1910) 23 HARv. L. REv. 26o. 
02 Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1908) 817-821. 
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validity, the legality of an agreement depends upon the will or choice 
of the parties thereto; but this conclusion is absurd, for the very 
meaning of an agreement or promise being invalid is that it is an agree ... 
ment or promise which, whatever the intention of the parties, the law 
will not enforce; the statement, for example, that under the law of 
England a promise-made without a consideration is void, means neither 
more nor less than.that the law will not enforce such a promise even 
though the parties intend to be legally bound by it, and this state of 
things cannot be altered by the fact that Englishmen contracting in 
England intend, and even in so many words expres~ their intention, 
that a promise made by one of them, X, to the other A, shall, though 
made without a consideration, be governed by the law of a foreign 
country, and therefore be valid. . . 
"The reply to this objection is that its force depends on a misunder-
standing of the principle contended for. No one can maintain that 
persons who really contract under one law can by any device whatever 
r-ender valid an agreement which that law treats as void or voidable. 
What is contended for is that the bona fide intention of the parties 
is the main element in determining what is the law under which they 
contract. To put the same assertion in another form, an English 
contract is governed by English law, a French contract is governed by 
French law; but when, say, an Englishman and a Frenchman, or two 
Englishmen, enter in England into a contract to be wholly or partly 
performed in France, their bona fide intention is, at any rate, the chief 
element in determining whether the contract is an English contract 
or a French contract. No doubt, in deciding this matter, the Court 
mu·st regard the whole circumstances of the case. As regards the 
interpretation of the contract, the expressed intention is decisive; 
as regards its essential validity or legality, this is not quite so certainly 
the case. If it is clear they meant to ,contract under one law, e. g. the 
law of England, no declaration of intention to contract under another 
law so as to give validity to the contract will avail them anything. But 
this result follows because in the view of the Court, their real intention 
was to enter into an English contract. 
"If this one solid objection to our theory be removed, the doctrine 
that, according, at any rate, to the view of English judges, the essential 
validity of a contract is determined by its proper law 'is, it is submitted, 
made out. It will be noted that in Rule 151, the statement is made that 
the essential validity of a contract is governed 'indirectly' by its proper 
law. The word 'indirectly' is inserted for the very purpose of showing 
that the parties cannot directly determine by their choice whether a 
contract shall be legal or not. What they can do is to determine what 
is the law under which they in fact contract, and the rules of this. law, 
i.e., the proper law, will, subject, however, to wide exceptions, deter-
mine whether a contract is essentially valid or invalid." 
In regard to this explanation Professor Beale makes the following 
observations :93 
"It is certainly not theoretically impossible," he says, " to assign a 
contract to some one state as the seat of the obligation and to have it 
governed by the law of that state. Some such suggestion has already 
been made by the author as solving the difficult question of what law 
governs a trust of chattels created inter vivos. This suggestion was 
.. (1910} 23 HARV. L. REV. 263. 
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made, however, not as to the creation of a trust, but as to its administra-
tion after it had been validly created. Before such a principle can 
come into force it is necessary to have a trust validly created. In the 
same way some such doctrine mignt well be accepted to govern the 
performance of a contract once validly created; but it is still necessary 
to get the obligation created, and until that it done the parties are hardly 
in a position to discuss the seat of its performance. The ingenious 
suggestion does not at all relieve us of the necessity of admitting, if we 
accept any rule giving effect to the intention of the parties, that we 
allow the parties by their own will to create an obligation, where, by the 
law of the pJace under which they act, no legal obligation would be 
attached to the agreement." 
So far as it applies to the validity of contracts the intention theory 
does not admit of a theoretic defence. The validity or invalidity of a 
legal transaction should result from fixed rules of law which are binding 
upon the parties. Allowing the parties to choose their law in this regard 
involves a delegation of sovereign power to private individuals. Dicey's 
explanation of the intention theory does not meet this objection. If the 
parties to a contract which is made in England and ~ to be performed 
in France can, by the mere operation of their will, make it a French 
contract or an English contract, which is subject, as regards intrinsic 
validity, to French or English law, respectively, they are in fact deter-
mining the validity of the contract, and to that extent exercising sover-
eign powers. This is true though they may he restricted in their choice 
to the law of the states with which the contract has a substantial 
connection. 
The writer rejects, however, the implication contained in the above 
quotation from Professor Beale that the law of the place where a 
contract is made necessarily determines its intrinsic validity. 
The intention theory has been adopted so widely as the fundamental 
basis "for the solution of the conflict of laws with ·respect to contracts, 
notwithstanding the theoretic objection mentioned, because it possesses 
certain practical advantages over the other rules that have been so far 
proposed. It can be overthrown, therefore, only if some substitute can 
be discovered which w.ill. possess the same practical advantages as the 
intention theory, without being open at the same time to the theoretic 
objection referred to. With this object in view let us examine briefly 
the different rules that have been suggested for the solution of the 
problem before us. 
I. View that the law of the place of contracting should dete-rm£ne, 
the £ntrinsic validity of contracts. In support of the lex loci the theory 
of a voluntary submission has been frequently advanced, but this is 
a mere fiction in the absence of a declaration of intention to that effect.94 
"'See I Aubry et Rau, Cours de droit civil fran~ais (5th ed. 1897) 163; Diena 
Principi di diritto intema:;ionale (1910) 245; I Foelix, Traite de droit internationai 
Prive (4th ed. 1866) 223; Niemeyer, Vorschliige und Materialien (1895) 242; 
(r8g8) 3 DEUTSCHE JuRISTENZEITUNG, 372; Pillet, Principes, 440; Valery 
Manuel de droit international prive (1914) 979-980. ' 
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Professor Beale contends that the law of the place of contracting has 
the exclusive power to create a contract, by reason of the territorial 
sovereignty of each state. 
"If the law of the place where the parties act ref~ses legal validity 
to their acts it is impossible to see on what principle some other law may 
nevertheless give their acts validity. Tlie law of the place of perfor-
mance can have no effe~t as law in another place, namely, the place 
where the parties act; for it is a fundamental doctrine of our law that 
'the laws of every st3Jte affect and bind directly • . . all contracts 
'made, and acts done within it. A state may therefore regulate . . . the 
'valldity of contracts and other acts done within it; the resulting 
'rights and duties growing out of these contracts and acts.' Any 
attempt to make the law of the place· of performance govern the act of 
contracting is an attempt to give to that law extraterritorial effect."95 
"In all these cases the matter must, it seems, be determined theoreti-
cally by the law governing the transaction, i. e., the law of the place 
where the parties act in making their agreement. If by the law their 
acts have no legal efficacy, then no other state can give them greater 
effect. If by the law of that state their acts created a binding obligation 
upon the parties, then the parties who have acted under thaf law must 
be bound by it."96 
"The question whether a contract is valid, that is, whether to the 
agreement of the parties the law has annexed an obligation to perform 
its terms, can on general principles be determined by no other law than 
that which applies to the acts, that is, by the law of the place of 
contracting. If the law at that place annexes an obligation· to the acts 
of the parties, t):le promisee has a legal right which no other law has 
power to take away except as a result of new acts which change it. 
If on the other hand the law of the place where the agreement is made 
annexes no legal obligation to it, there is no other law which has power 
to do so •.. 
"This doctrine gives full scope to the territoriality of law, and enables 
each sovereign to regulate acts of agreement done in his own terri-
tory."97 
Professor Minor98 appears to share in general Professor Beale's 
views, al~ough he does not deduce therefrom the same conclusions 
as the latter ~egarding the intrinsic validity of contracts. The Supreme 
Court of the United States also has adopted the same theory with respect 
.. (1910) 23 HARv. L. REv. 267. 
""_!d., 268. 
rn I d., 270-271. 
"'"The only law. that can operate to create a contract is the law of the place 
where the contract is entered into (le~ celebrationis). If the parties enter into 
an agreement in a particular state, the law of that state alone can determine 
whether a contract has been made. If by the law of the state 1w contract has 
been made, there is no contract. Hence, if by the le~ celebrationis the parties 
are incapable of making a binding contract, there is no contract upon which the 
law of any other state can operate. It is void ab initio." Conflict of Laws 
(1901) 410. 
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to the legislative power of the individual states99 and, of late, with 
respect to torts in generaP 
The doctrine of the territoriality of law is fundamental in Anglo-
American law, but the consequences deduced therefrom, so far as the 
conflict of laws is concerned, are often misleading, and not infrequently 
erroneous. Story himself is not free from criticism in this respect. 
He says:2 
"The first and most general maxim or proposition is that which has 
been already adverted to, that every nation posse:sses an exclusive sover-
eignty and jurisdiction within its own territory. 
"The direc;t consequence of this rule is, that .the laws of every state 
affect and bind all property, 'whether "real or personal, within its terri-
tory, and all persons who are resident within it, whether natural-born 
subjects or aliens, and also all contracts made and acts done within it." 
What does Story mean when he says that the laws of every state affect 
all contracts made within it? The statement would seem to imply 
that all contracts executed in the state of X are subject to the rules 
governing contracts in that state, but that cannot be Story's meaning, 
for in a later section he makes it perfectly plain thqt if the place of 
performance is in the state of Y the laws of the state of Y wilf control. 
The maxim f).lrnishes therefore no rule for the solution of the conflict 
of laws. 
Story's second maxim is equally ambiguous. 
"An.other maxim or proposition is that no state or nation can by its 
laws directly affect or bind property out of its territory, or bind persons 
not resident therein, whether they are natural-born subjects or others. 
This. a natural consequence of the first proposition."3 
If this maxim is intended to state only that the sovereign state of X 
cannot compel the sovereign state of Y to enforce laws enacted by the 
state of X or to recognize the privaie rights thereby created, the 
statement is obviously true, but of no help in solving the problems of 
the conflict of laws. Should the meaning of the passage be, on the 
other hand, that the state of Y will recognize the rights created by the 
state of X so far as they fall within the legislative limits laid down by 
the first maxim, but not if the legislation transcended those limits, the 
generalization is entirely t~o broad. The recognition or non-recogni-
.. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Clements (18g1) 140 U. S. 226, II Sup. Ct. 822; 
New _Fork Life Ins. Co. v. Head (1914) 234 U. S. 149, 34 Sup. Ct. 879; New 
York J;.ife Ins. Co.'lA Dodge (1918) 246 U.S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct. 337; cf. Am. Fire. 
Ins. Co. v. Ktng Lumber C01. (1919) 250 U. S. 2, 39 Sup. Ct. 431. A stipulation 
that the law of another state shall govern -will be ineffective if inconsistent with 
the law of the state where the contract was made. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hill 
(~904) 193 U.S. 551,24 Sup. Ct. 538; Stepreme Lodge v. Meyer (1905) 1g8 U.S. 
soB, 25 Sup. Ct. 754-
1Slater v. Me~ican Nat. Ry. (1904) 194 U.S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. s8r; .Westem 
U11ion Tel. Co. v. Brown (1914) 234 ·u.S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955; Spokane Inland 
Ry. v. Whitley (1915) 237 U. S. 487, 35 Sup. Ct. 655. 
2 Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1883) 21. a I d., 22. 
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tion of the rights in question would depend upon the rules of the conflict 
of laws existing in the state of Y, which might reject in large measure 
the claims of the lex loci. If the· above maxim has reference· to the 
effect of such legislation in the state of X and be intended to convey 
the thought that the state of. X has no power, so far as its own organs 
are concerned, to create rights based upon acts occurring in the state 
of Y, it is absolrtte1y erroneous. Story himself admits that a contract 
made in the state of Y but to be performed in the state of X would be 
subject to the law of the state of X. Professor Beale holds, consist-
ently with his fundamental theory, that the law of the place of con-
tracting governs the validity of contracts, irrespective of the law of 
the place of performance. "If the law of the place where the agree-
"ment is made," he says/ "annexes no legal obligation to it, there is 
"no other law which has the power to do so." It may be properly 
asked, however, who conferred such exclusive power upon the state 
wliere the contract was made? Such power was certainly not conferreJ 
by a common superior having power to define and to limit the legislative 
and judicial power of the various states, for no such superior exists as 
yet. The power must be derived therefore from agreement; but no 
such agreement, even in a tacit form, can be shown to exist. No 
common usage nor rule of international law defining the legiSlative 
and judicial power of nations in the matter of the conflict of laws has 
so far been developed.5 The power of each state to create private 
rights is, so far as its own organs are concerned, necessarily unre-
stricted.6 A sovereign state has in the very nature of things the power 
to attach any legal consequences whatever to any state of facts what-
ever, including a,cts in other countries, even by persons not citizens or 
residents of the former. The conditions under which it will do so are 
determined, on grounds of policy, by each sovereign himself. A,s 
regards this country .these conditions are prescribed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States so far as the question falls within the 
provisions of the federal Constitution; in other respects the individual 
states are free to adopt such rules of the conflict of laws as they may 
deem best. 
The writer has discussed this question in another place where he 
says in part: 
"Notwithstanding these statements by such eminent authorities it 
is submitted that while the theory that .a particular territorial la~ is 
excl~ively ~pplic~ble to a particular set of operative facts may be 
establtshed m th1s country as a matter of constitutional law it 
cannot be accepted analytically as a sound basis for the conflict of l~ws. 
Where all the operative facts occur in a single state it may be conceded 
that as· a matter .of expediency the rights of the parties should be 
4 (1910) 23 HARv. L. REv. 271. 
• Concerning the relationship between international la.w and the conflict of laws 
see (1920) 20 Cor.. L. REv. 269-270, 278-279 . 
• 1 d., 2]2-.28o. 
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determined ordinarily in accordance with the law of such state. But 
if the forum sees fit, it may adopt another rule. Where the operative 
facts occur in or affect more th;m one state, there is much greater 
difficulty in selecting the governing· rule. Generally speaking, Anglo-
American law will incorporate the law of some particular foreign 
state. It will select at times the law of the place where the act was 
done or was to be performed ; at other times, the law of the situs of 
the property and not of the place of acting; at other times still it will 
choose neither the law of the place of acting nor that of the situs of 
the property but the law of the domicil. Where a contract is entered 
into through an agent, it will bind the principal in accordance with the 
law of the place where the agent acts, although the principal was never 
in the latter state· and he had no capacity under the law of the state 
in which he was domiciled and in which he appointed the agent. Some-
times a legal transaction will be sustained if it conforms to the law of 
one of several states. 
"That there is no logical necessity for the application of any partie~ 
ular rule selected by Anglo-American law is seen from the fact that 
different rules with respect to the same set of facts often prevail in 
foreign countries. Nor can our rules of the conflict of laws be 
explained by any theory of 'territoriality' other than the general doc-
trine that the law of the forum selects the rules which shall control. 
In fact, the only answer· that can be given to the question why the 
common law has chosen a particular rule to govern in the conflict of 
laws or in ~my other branch of law is that it has seemed to the forum 
sound policy to do so ... 7 
"As long as the Anglo-American notion of law is based upon the 
existence of physical force on the part of organized society, all legal 
relations, including rights, duties, privileges, no-rights, powers, liabili-
ties, immunities and disabilities must necessarily have reference to 
.some particular territorial law. Each organized society, by virtue of 
its- existence as a sovereign, is obliged to define for itself what rights, 
duties, privileges, etc. shall attach to the operative facts which may be 
presen!ed for determination to its judicial or executive agents, without 
directions or suggestions from the organized society within whose terri-
tory those facts may have occurred. Whether the operative . facts 
happened wholly within its territory or partly or wholly without such 
territory cannot make any difference. 'Rights' being the correlatives 
?£' :duti~s,' for the non-performance of which organized society will 
~~~c~ d1sa~reeable cqnsequences upc;m the person owing the d1~ies, 
~t IS II?Jpossible, _of course, to recogm~e that. a par!Jr has a legal right 
m a g~ven state 1f there are no remed1es available m such state for its 
enforcement."8 
Professor Beale seems to think that Lord Mansfield, Story, and 
practiCally all the English and American judges who have applied the 
intention theory or some rule other than the lex loci. in the detenniita-
tion of the validity of· contracts have been misled into accepting the 
continental theory of law.9 This assumption is, however, without 
foundation. The truth of the matter is rather, that the law of the place 
7 I d., 274-
• I d., 276-277. 
• See (1909) 23 HARv. L. REv. 7. 
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of contracting appeared to furnish too narrow a basis for the solution 
of the conflict of laws and was rejected for that reason as an exclusive 
rule governing the intrinsic validity of contracts. 
Let us consider now the advantages and disadvantages of the lex 
loci. From a practical point of view the chief advantage of the lex 
loci over any other rule is its simplicity. Even as regards contracts 
by correspondence the application of this Fule presents less difficulty 
than that of the debtor's domicil or that ·of the place of performance. 
It is urged also that the lex loci is the only rule that can successfully 
cope with the vexed question of bilateral contracts, inasmuch as it 
necessarily leads to the application of one law in the determination of 
the rights and duties of the parties. Another argument urged in favor 
of the law of the place of contracting is the fact that it is the only law 
which both parties can ascertain with equal facility. With respect to 
contracts inter praesentes this contention is sound. The lex loci is 
in those cases the only law with respect to which both parties can get 
expert advice, 10 for a lawyer has technical lrnowlE.dge only of the law 
of the state or country in which he is practicing. 
The chief objection raised against the law of the place of contracting 
is that it :is "accidental, transitory, foreign to the substance of the 
"obligation."11 This is especially true in contracts concluded by corre-
spondence, which constitute perhaps the majority of the cases arising 
in the conflict of laws.12 In these cases the lex loci may be wholly 
accidental, and the assumpticm that both parties can get with equal 
facility expert legal advice is without foundation. The place of con-
tracting is not !mown in these cases until the negotiations are completed, 
and even if it could be !mown beforehand, it would be a foreign law to 
at least one of the contracting parties. The place of contracting is 
dependent in these cases upon positive rules of law which vary consid-
erably in the different countries.13 In this country it is determined 
by tlie last act that was necessary to make it a binding contract. If, for 
example, the negotiations are carried on between parties in Connecticut 
and in New York, and the final letter happens to ·be posted in New 
Jersey, it would be a New Jersey contract, and subject to New Jersey 
law. The validity of the contract would thus be determined by a 
10 Jd., ZJI-272. 
11 Savigny, Private International Law (Guthrie's transl. 1880) rg8. 
12 Many continental writers contend therefore that contracts by correspondence 
should be governed by the law of the domicil of the offeror, by the law which will 
postpone the formation of the contract longest, or by some other law. Bartin, 
(1897) 24 CLUNE'L, 476; Etudes de droit international prive (1899) 44-45; 
Chretien, (1891) 18 CLUNET, 1028; Dreyfus, L'a.cte juridique en droit interna-
tional prive (1904) 363. In favor of the national law of the offeror Cass. Turin 
(Jan. 31, IB!)I), (IB!)I) 18 UUNET, I026. 
u In Belgium, Italy, Roumania, Russia and other countries the contract is not 
deemed completed until the letter of acceptance reaches the offeror. (1920) 20 
Cor.. L REv. 252, notes 31-35. 
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law which had no other connection with the contract than the accidental 
mailing of the letter of acceptance in that state. 
2. View that the law .of the place of performance should control. 
The view that the law of the place of-performance should control the 
validity and effects of contracts is due in this country, as was shown 
in a previous article, to the influence of Lord Mansfield's dictum in 
Robinson v; Bland.14 This dictum was accepted by the early American 
cases and was reinforced by Story in his celebrated treatise on the con-
flict of laws. Story states that the application of the law of the place 
of performance results from "natural justice,"15 and he relies in support 
of his conclusion upon passages from the Roman law, upon certain 
of the old continental writers, upon Lord Mansfield's · dictum, and 
upon the American cases that adopted this dictum. So far as the 
authorities cited by Story bear out his contention/6 they will be found 
to be based principally upon a passage in the Corpus Juris Civilis : 
"Contraxisse unusquisque in eo loco intellegitur, in quo ut solveret, se 
obligavit.''11 Story cites this passage. The foreign writers referred 
to by Story base their conclusion largely upon this passage, as did 
also Huber, whose views were adopted by Lord Mansfield. The great 
Romanist,. Wachter, has shown, however, that the provision of the 
Roman law relied upon cannot be accepted in a literal way, and that it 
may express only the Roman law relating to the jurisdiction of courts.18 
Savigny relied upon the above. passage of the Roman law to support 
the application of the law of the place of performance, but he soug~t 
to justify it also on principle. 
He contended that a contract has its "seat" at the place where it 
is to be performed. The place of contracting was in his opinion acci-
dental, transitory, and foreign to the substance of the obligation and 
to its further development arid effect, whereas the whole expectation of 
the parties is directed to performance. · He concluded therefrom· that 
unless the ,parties have expressed their intention to be governed ·by 
some other law, they must be deemed to have contracted with reference 
to the law of the place of performance.19 Where there is .no evidence 
14 (I76o, K. B.) 2 Burr. 1077. 
"" Op. cit. note 2, at p. 376. 
18 
See Lorenzen, Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills and Notes (19i9) III-IIg. 
17 Digest, XLIV, 7, 21. 
18 
(1842) 25 ARcHIV FUR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS, 42-43. 
10 
"In every obligation, then, we fin!f principally and uniformly two visible 
phenomepa which we might ta~e ·as our guides. Every obligation arises out of 
visible facts; every obligation is also fulfilled by visible facts; both of these 
must happen at one place or another. We can, therefore, select either the place 
where the obligation has originated, or the place where it is fulfilled, as· deter-
mining its seat and lts forum-either the beginning or the end of the obligation. 
To which of the two points shall we give the prefe~ence upon general pri~ciples? 
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showing an actual. intention of the parties, this assumption is of 
course a. mere fiction. 
The arguments advanced by Savigny in favor of the law of the 
place of performance are unquestionably very weighty, and are 
especially so where the place of performance is not in doubt.20 The. 
rule is certain and easy of application and is based upon an internal, 
instead of an external or casual relationship between the contract 
and the governing law. Where the place of performance is not fixed, 
however, the lex loci solutionis is less certain that the lex loci. In these 
cases difficult questions of fact concerning the place of performance 
may arise.21 Where !the making 10f the contract is prohibited by a 
distinct local policy, such as is ·involved in legislation forbidding the 
execution of contracts on Sunday, it is apparent that the law of the 
place of performance cannot reasonably control.22 The Supreme CotJrt 
of Wisconsin23 was clearly in error when it denied the validity of a· note 
which had been executed and delivered on Sunday in New York, under 
the law of which it was valid, because it was payable in Massachusetts, 
where all executory agreements for the payment of money, including 
bonds and promissory notes, made and delivered on Sunday were 
void as between the parties. The Massachusetts statute had obviously 
exclusive reference to the execution of notes in Massachusetts and 
"Not to the origin. This is in itself accidental, transitorY-, foreign to the 
substance of .the obligation and to its further development and efficacy. If in 
the eyes of the parties a permanent influence reaching into the future were to be 
ascribed to the place where the obligation arose, this certainly could not flow 
from the mere constituent act, but only from the connection of that act with 
extrinsic circumstances, by which a definite expectation of the parties was directed 
to that place. 
"The case is quite different with respect to the fulfilment, which is indeed the 
very essence of the obligation. For the obligation consists just in this, that some-
thing which .was previously in the free choice of a person; is p.ow changed into 
something necessary,-that which was hitherto !Jncertain, into a certainty; and 
when this necessary and certajn thing has come to pass, that is just the fulfilment. 
To this, therefore, the whole expectation of the parties is directed; and it is 
therefore part of the essence of the obligation that the place of fulfilment is 
conceived of as the seat· of the obligation, that the special forum-of the obligation 
is fixed at this place by voluntary submission." Savigny, op. cit. note II, Ig8-I99. 
20 Many eminent writers ·have accepted Savigny's view. I Dernburg, Pandekten 
(7th ed. I902) 106; I Lehrbucli des biirgerlichen Rechts (3rd ed. xgo6) III; 
Barazetti, Das internatio1fale Privatrecht i~ burgerlichen Gesetzbuche fiir das 
deutsche Reich (1897) 55; I Endemann, Lehrbuch des biirgerlichen Rechts 
(9th ed. 1903) 97; I Gerber, System des deutschen Privatrechts (17th ed. x8gs) 
41; I Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht (1895) 232, notes 65 and 66. 
21 Story, op. cit. 381 ff.; Minor, op. cit., 377-380. In some countries the place of 
performance is, under these circumstances, fixed by law. This is, according to 
Niemeyer, a very complicated legal term. Op. cit. note 94, at p. 241. 
=Arbuckle v. Reaume (I893) g6 Mich. 243, 55 N. W. 8o8; Brown v. Browning 
(1886) IS R. I. 422, 7 Atl. 403'-
.. Brown v. Gates (1903) 120 Wis. 349, 97 N. W. 221. 
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did not intend to prescribe a Sunday policy for the state of New York. 
The rule that the law of the place of performance goyerns fails com-
pletely in the case of bilateral contracts in which each party agrees 
to perform his part of the agreement in a different state.24 In this 
class of cases there js no single place of performance which can deter-
mine the validity of the contract. The rule fails likewise where a party 
under a~ entire and i:adivisible contract agrees to perform different 
parts of the contract in different states/5 or where a contract is to be 
performed either in one state or in another at the option of the 
promisor.26 
3· View that tfze personal law should control. 
(I) The national law of each party. The view that the common 
national law of the parties should determine the validity of contracts 
is supported on principle by the Italian school, which emphasizes the 
personal quality of law.27 
(2) The national law of the debtor. Zitelmann, the most extreme 
advocate of the international theory of law, -concludes that the national 
law of the debtor is the competent law to determine the validity of-
contracts. He says :· 
"The obligation results from a command to do or not to do, addressed 
by objective law to the debtor. With respect to questions arising in 
the law of obligations the competent law from the standpoint of Private 
International Law is therefore the law which has the power, according 
to International Law, to command, and we have seen that, except as to 
torts, it is 'the debtor's personal statute (lex patriae) ."28 
(3) The law of the debtor's domicil. As a result of Bar's influence 
the law of the debtor's domicil has gained considerable favor as the law 
governing the validity of contracts. 
"Courts and writers accepting the law of the place of performance as the 
governing law abandon their rule in these cases, and apply either the le% loci or 
some other law. German Imperial Court (Feb. 13, r89r) 47 SEUFFERT's ARcHrv, 
3· See also (Apr. 4, rgo8) 68 RG 203; (Apr. 19, 1910) 73 RG 379; (Feb. 4 1913) 
8r RG 273; Neumann, Intemationales Privatrecht (r8g6) 91; 2 Zitelmann, 
Internationa?es Privatrecht (1912) 4II. 
,. This question has arisen in this country frequently with reference to carriers' 
contracts, in which the le%, loci contractus has beeri commonly substituted for the 
le% loci solutionis. McDmuel v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (r868)' 24 Iowa, 412; 
Illinois .Cent. Ry. v. Beebe (r8g8) 174 Ill. 13, so N. E. 1019; Brockway v. Am~ri­
can E%press Co. (18g8) 171 Mass. rs8, so N. E. 626; Minor, op. cit., 38L 
•• If the promisor fails to perform jn· either state the place of performance 
cannot be determined. Meili, International Civil and Commercial Law (Kuhn's 
transl. 1905) 382; Pillet, (1904) 20 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNA-
T~ONAL, 157; Roguin, id., 79, note. 
27 F~sinato, II principia della sculoa italiana nel diritto privata internazionale 
(1884) 33 ARcHrvo GIURIDrco s83-S84, 3 Weiss, Traite de droit i1uemational 
prive (2d'ed. 1912) 70 if.; 4 id. 345, 357· 
28 2 Internationales Privatrecht (1912) 366. Accord: r Crome, Syztem des 
deutschm biirgerlichen Rechts (1900) 137. 
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"This theory ... ," says Bar,28 "i~ _in principle. the correct theory,. for 
this reason, that the general proposttlons of law m the matte~ o~ ?bhga-
tions, the rules which do not give way to the pleasure of the mdtvtdual~, 
exist generally in the interest of the debtor. We cannot hold that thts 
protection shall cease on a subject by accident undertaking an obliga-' 
tion in a foreign country, or having to perform one there." 
The principal objection to this view is that the assumption that most 
laws have for their aim the protection of the debtor is unfounded. 
There is no reason, th~refore, why the creditor should submh to the law 
of the debtor. From a practical viewpoint the rule is open to the 
same objections as that of the place of performance. 
4· View that the intrinsic validity cannot be determined by a single 
rule. Professor Minor contends that the intrinsic validity of contracts 
should be determined with reference to the law of the place of contract-
ing if it relates to the making of the contract, by the law of the place 
of performance if it relates to the performance, and by the law of the 
situs of the consideration if it relates to the consideration.3° For 
example, if a contract is made on Sunday in a state under the law of 
which the making o£ the contract is prohibited, ~he contract should 
be regarded as void everywhere.31 If the illegality relates, on the 
other hand, to the performance of the contract, the law of the place 
of performa:nce should controP2 .The validity of an executory consid-
eration is regarded by Professor Minor as governed by principles 
similar to the above.33 As regards executed consideration, the effect 
of the want of consideration is referred by Professor Minor to the 
law of the place of' contracting,34 and the subsequent failure of the 
consideration, to the law of the place of performance.35 The legality 
of the consideration as affecting the validity of the contract he would 
determine by the lex loci considerationis.36 
5· View that the intrinsiC' validity of a contract should be determine'd 
by the. law of the state with which the ·contract has the most real connec-
tion. Westlake is of the opinion that this view is supported ·by the 
English courts.37 
6. View that the validity of a contract is governed by the law under 
which the parties contract, the bona fide intention of the parties being 
the main element in determining what that law is. Professor Dicey 
feels that the English decisions sustain this view.38 
""Private Intemational Law (Gillespie's transl 18g2) 543-544 
.. Minor, op. cit., 401-402. 
11 I d., 403. 
32 !d., 404-405, 418-421 . 
.. !d., 421. 
•• I d., 424-425. 
33 I d., 425· 
.. I d., 427-429. 
01 Westlake, Private lnternatio11al Law (5th ed. 1912) 305. 
38 Dicey, op. cit. note 92, at p. 545-546, 814 ff. 
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7· View that the contract should be regarded as invalid unless it 
satisfies the .-local law of all states with which it is connected. This 
view has been proposed with respect ·to contracts made by correspond-
ence.39 
8. Jitta's view. Jitta's method for the solution of the problems 
arising from contracts in their international relations is unique and 
deserves a brief notice. It can best be stated in his own words :.4° 
"From my point of. view private international law is not the science 
of the conflict of laws, but the private law itself considered from the 
point of view of the requirements of the juridical community of man-
kind. The solution of the conflicts, the reference to the law of the 
state of X or to the law of the state of Z, is a means and not an end. 
The reference furnishes only the lesser half of the solution, i. e., cer-
tainty as regards the rule to be applied ; but such certainty all rules 
afford, even the meist mechanical ones. In order to gain the other 
half of the solution, i.e., the harmony between the rule and actual 
life, it is necessary that the law to be applied be calculated to assure 
the reasonable order of society, a condition which a mechanical rule, 
referring to a certain law, does not necessarily fulfil, and which may 
necessitate the formulation of a juridical rule, independent of the 
laws which are said to be in conflict. The application of a foreign law 
should take place only if such application is demanded by a reasonable 
order of the universal society. . . 
"A juridical relation presents itself from a national point of view if 
it belongs from the standpoint of the legislator or judge to the active 
local life for which the national law has been established in the first 
place. In this sphere of action the judge will apply without 
hesitation the law of his country, for the state whose organ he is con-
s.iders the application of this law certainly as a requirement of the 
reasonable order of this society. . . 
"States and judges may find themselves face to face with juridical 
relations. belonging to the active local life of a foreign country . . . 
Respect for the foreign law imposes itself with regard to these juridical 
relations, except where considerations 'of a universal public order .are 
opposed. : . 
"FinaUy, a juridical relation may not belong to the active local life of 
a society but to the active, international or universal life. . . . The 
judge or state whose organ he is, is under a duty to apply to the inter-
national juridical relationship the law belonging to it in the universal 
active life. . . . Such law (droit) may be identical either with the 
!a,w. (!oi) .of a certain cou?try; (tl1::t ?f the co.untry in which the judge 
IS s1ttmg IS not excluded If the JUridical reqmrements of the universal 
social life refer to it) or it may be an independent provision which is 
derived from a consideration of the local public order and the universal 
public order." 
.. Hindenburg, Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee, 263, 
285; Jette!, Handbuch des internationalen Privat- 1md Strafrechts (1893) Io8-
rog; Barazetti, op. cit. note 20, at pp. 54-55; 2 Zitelmann, op. cit. note 24, at p. 
164-
.. I La substance des obligations dans le droit international prive (Igo6) 20-23. 
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In accordance with the method above set forth, Jitta rejects all 
general· rules like those of the law of the place of contracting, the law 
of the place of performance, the national law or the law of the domicil 
as too mechanical: He inquires instead first of all whether the par-
ticular relationship in question can be .localized; If it belongs to th~ 
local sphere of a particular law he applies the law of that state, ~ubj ect 
to its rules of public. policy. If it does not belong to a local sphere, 
but to the international sphere, he applies what he calls the international-
common rules, and in the absence of such rules, the reasonable princi-
ples, limited by the requirements of the universal public order.41 
The above is a summary of the principal rules or metho4s by means 
of which the intrinsic validity of contracts may be determined. Which 
of these should be adopted by the English and American courts? Some 
can be eliminated without dijliculty. This is true first of all of Jitta's 
proposed method of solving the problem, which leaves the judge prac-
tically without any definite guide to go by. The view also which 
requires a contract to satisfy the law of .all the states with which it is 
connected cannot be seriously considered. Sound policy suggests that 
international transactions be sustained as far as possible, instead of 
being defeated.· The lex pat1·iae also cannot be approved because it is 
out of harmony with the fundamental conceptions of Anglo-American 
law. The law of. the domicil of the debtor rests upon the erroneous 
assumption that most laws ar:e enacted for the benefit' of the debtor, 
and is open to other objections, which make it unacceptable. The 
choice lies, therefore, between the adoption of the law of the place of 
contracting or of the law of the place of performance, on the one hand, 
and the views supported by Minor, Westlake, and Dicey, on the other. 
As has been shown above, the exclusive application of either the law 
of the place of contracting or of the law of the place of performance 
will not solve satisfactorily ~he different questions arising in connection 
with the intrinsic validity of contracts. The former rule is unsuitable 
where the perfornumce of the contract is illegal, for in this case the 
law of the place of performance is. clearly the proper rule.42 For a 
similar reason the law of the place of performance cannot reasonably 
41
2 id. 5o6; The Renovation of International Law (1919) 138. 
.,Courts and writers appear to agree on this rule. Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Way (1887) 83 Ala. 542; Minor, op. cit., 418-421; Dicey, op. c#., 553; Harburger 
and Bar, (1900) 18 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 50. 
The same rule should apply on principle if the performance becomes illegal 
subsequently t~ the execution of the contract. Ralli Bros. v. Compania Naviera 
Sota y Aznar (1920, C. A.) 25 Times C. C. 227; cf. Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais 
(1884) L. R. 12 Q. B. Div. 589; Dicey, op. cit., 554- Contra: Tweedie Trading 
Co. v. McDonald (1902, S.D. N.Y.) 114 Fed. 985; Richards & Co. v. Wresclmer 
(1916) 174 App. Div. 484. 156 N. Y. Supp. 1054 
Dicey thinks that the rule would not be applied by the English courts to any 
contract made in violation, or with a view to the violation, of the revenue laws of 
any foreign country not forming part of the British Dominions. Op. cit., 553: 
Anson takes a contrary view. Cotttract (Corbin's ed. 1919) 287-288. 
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apply where the execution of the contract is prohibited by a stringent 
·local policy existing at the place of execution.43 To this extent it would 
seem necessary therefore to recognize both the lex loci contractus and 
the lex loci solutionis. 
The problem is thus narrowed down to the followiqg: "What law 
shall govern the intrinsic validity of contracts in so far as the question 
does not fall within a stringent local policy existing either at the plac~ 
of contracting or at the place of performance? It i_s submitted that 
neither the lex loci contractus nor the lex loci solutionis will furnish 
a satisfactory solution in these cases. The law of the place of perform-
ance has the advantage of possessing an internal relationship wij:h the 
contract, but to apply it gives rise to much uncertainty where the place 
of performance is not fixed, and the rule is impossible of application in 
the case of bilateral contracts in which each party agrees to perform 
in a different state, and in other cases. The lex loci is certain and easy 
of application, but as an absolute ru1e it does not always bring about 
desirable results. The case of Pritchard v. N orton,"4 refe~red to in 
a preceding article, may serve as an illustration. The defendant in 
that case executed and delivered to the plaintiff a bond of indemnity 
in the state of New York in which he undertook to indemnify him 
against all loss arising from his liability as surety upon an appeal bond 
executed by him on behalf of the defendant as appellant in a suit then 
pending in Louisiana, The plaintiff, having become liable on the 
appeal bond, and having paid the amount due, brought an -action 
against the defendant for the recovery of the amount. The defendant 
set up by way of defense that the bond sued on was without considera-
tion and void under the laws of the state of New York. If the intrinsic 
validity of contracts is to he governed absolutely by the lex loci, the 
defendant would escape liability under the facts of this case, but it 
wauld seem that in all fairness he ought to be held. The defendant 
would be liable if the lex loci solutionis were applied. This rule would 
render the indemnity bond invalid, however, i{ the original litigation 
had been brought in New York and the indemnity bond had been exe-
cuted in Louisiana, and that would be unfortunate. The Supr~me 
Court of the United States sustained the validity of the indemnity bond 
in the above case by ·adopting the intention theory and holding tliat 
the parties must have contracted, in view of all the circumstances, 
with reference to the law of Louisiana. 
Professor Minor45 supports the decision in Pritchard v. Norton 
because, according to him, the situs of the consideration was in Louis-
iana. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States does not 
suggest, however, that the consideration of a contract may be go~emed 
in a· case like the one before the court by a separate law, but placed its 
43 
As, for example, the policy prohibiting the execution of contracts on Stinday. 
Arbuckle v. Reaume, supra note 22. 
" (1882) Io6 U. S. 124, I Sup. Ct. 102 • 
.. Op. cit., 426-427. 
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decision in part on the intention theory and in part upon the fact that 
Louisiana was tht; place of performance. Pritchard's antecedent debt 
was contracted in Louisiana, but the defendant's promise to indemnify 
him was given in New York. The question was, therefore, whether 
a past consideration would support the promise, and this question wa,s 
naturally determined by the court with reference to the law governing 
the intrinsic validity of the contract itself. Professor Minor's conten-
tion, that the validity of a contract as regards the question of consider-
ation must be controlled by the law of the situs of the consideration 
irrespective of the law of the place where the contract was made or was 
to be performed, has no support from the cases.40 English and Ameri-
can courts have not separated the element of consideration from the 
other elements making up the intrinsic validity of contracts, and have 
not subjected the contract in that regard to the law of the situs of the 
consideration, but they have invariably regarded the law governing the 
contract in general as controlling also with respect to the consideration. 
Where a note is given in the state of X for a debt incurred in the 
state cif Y, the defence being that the debt is "illegal and void, the 
courts will determine the illegality of the debt of course with reference 
to the law of the state of Y, whiCh governed the contract out of which 
the debt arose. The question, however, whether such a debt can 
support the contract made in the state of X is determined by the law of 
the latter state. 
Cases like the above show the necessity of finding a rule with greater 
flexibility than that possessed by any of the rules so far considered, 
excepting Jitta's. If this conclusion is sound, the final choice will 
lie between the views formulated by Westlake and Dicey and an alter-
native rule._ Westlake's a.ild Dicey's views are both based upon the 
decisions of the "English courtS and agree in determining the law under 
which a contract was made from the surrounding circumstances of the 
case: The English courts .are in the habit of speaking about the law 
intended by the parties, ot the law which the parties ought to be 
presumed to have intended, in view of the attendant circumstances ; 
the question is, therefore, whether this is merely a. way of stating that 
the law of the state with which the contract is deemed to have the 
closest connection governs the intrinsic validity of contracts without 
reference to the actual intention of the parties; or whether their inten-
tion is a material factor in the determination of the law. Westlake 
takes the former view of the English law. The solution is theoretically 
sound, but from a practical point of view it is open to the objection that 
the governing law is made to depend upon an appreciation of all the 
facts of -the case, in regard to which different inferences will be drawn 
by different courts. The validity or invalidity 9f a contract must 
under this rule re~ain uncertain in many cases until the question has 
been decided by the courts. If a rule is to be found which will 
produce greater certainty, a choice must be made between the intention 
.. Wharton, Conflict of Lav.:s (3rd ed. 1905) II92-II94-
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theory and a rule in the alternative. The theoretical objections to the 
intention theory have been mentioned above.41 From the standpoint of 
practical convenience it has the advantage of being a flexible rule 
which can take into consideration the needs of the particular case. 
Unless it is interpreted, however, as supporting any contract which 
is valid under any law with which the contract has a substantial connec-
tion, i. e. as practically equivalent to the alternative rule to be proposed, 
it is open to the same objection as the rule just discussed. Dicey's state-
ment of the intention theory is subject to this criticism. He main-
tains that persons who really ~ontract under one ·law cannot by any 
device render valid a contract which that law treats as invalid. Where 
a contract is made in England and has no connection with France, the 
parties cannot validly stipulate that its intrinsic validity shall be deter-
mined by French law, but if the contract is connected with France-if, 
for example, the place of performance is in that country-the bona fide 
intention of the parties is, according to Dicey, the chief element iri deter-
mining whether the contract is an English contract or a French contract. 
Dicey adds, however:48 
"If it is clear they meant to contract under one law, e. g. the law of 
England, no declaration of intention to contract under another law so 
as to give validity to the contract will avail them anything. But this 
result follows because in the view of the court, their real intention 
was to enter into an English contract." 
The parties cannot, therefore, directly determine by their choice whether 
a contract shall be legal or not. All they can.do is to determine what 
is the law under which they in fact contract, and this question must be 
decided by the courts in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. 
The necessity of such an examination into and appreciation of the 
facts makes the uli!1mate decision of the case necessarily doubtful, and 
this renders the intention theory in this form open, from the standpoint 
of certainty, to the same objections as was Westlake's view. 
There is in the opinio4 of the writer· but one way to get a rule that 
is certain and is yet sufficiently elastic to be able to sustain a contract 
like that in Pritchard v. Norton, even if the facts of the latter case 
were reversed, and that is by regarding contracts as valid if they satisfy 
the law of any state with which they have a substantial connection. 
No case has gone quite so far as this. There is a considerable amount 
of dicta, however, to the effect that there is a presumption that the 
parties contracted with a view to the law of the state that will sustain 
the contract.49 As regards usury the American cases have virtually 
allowed the parties to contract with reference to the law of any state 
with which the contract has a substantial connection.50 Although 
•• Supra p. 658. 
•• Op. cit., 820. 
•• See, for example, Pritchard v. Norton, supra note 44· 
00 Miller v. Tiffany (1863, U. S.) I Wall. 298; Arnold v. Potter (1867) 22 Iowa, 
194; Scott v. Pe.rlee (1883) 39 Oh. St. 63. 
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Anglo-American courts have been disinclined to lay down alternative 
rules for the solution of any question in the conflict of laws, such a 
rule was adopted in the case of In re Hellmann!s Will;61 in which a 
German legatee under an English will was permitted to receive his 
property when he was of age either under English law or under German 
law. Alternative rules have been adopted also by statute in England 
with respect to the formal requirements of wills relating to movable 
property and in this country with respect to the execution of deeds and 
wills. 5 2 The adoption of an alternative rule with respect to the intrinsic 
validity of contracts offers a practical means of solving a most difficult 
problem in the Conflict of Laws by a rule which is not open to the 
theoretical objection raised against the intention theory and which is 
sufficiently certain and elastic to sustain contracts which in fairness 
should be sustained. It is submitted, therefore 
I. That the intrinsic validity of contracts should be recognized if 
the local53 law of any state with which the contract has a substantial 
connection be satisfied. 
2. That such contracts be regarded as invalid 
a. if their execution is prohibited by some stringent policy of 
the place of contracting; 
b. if their performance is illegal under the law of the place 
of performance. 
If the direct recognition of the alternative rule suggested should 
appear to our courts to be too radical an innovation, the same end can 
be attained in a less scientific way by a general recognition of the 
intention theory, as it is understood in the usury cases, with a prima 
facie presumption that the parties contracted with reference to the law 
that will sustain the contract. 
The same principles should control where the validity or invalid1ty 
does not concern the contract as a whole, but only some particular 
provision. 5 4 
The above discussion has been confined to the determination of the 
law that should govern the validity or invalidity of contracts on prin-
ciple. The conclusion reached must be understoqd, of course, to be 
subject to the qualification that a contract, whether valid by its proper 
law or not, will not be enforced if it. is deemed to conflict with the 
essential public or moral interests of the forum.55 
(To be concluded in November) 
•• (r866) L. R 2 Eq. 363 . 
.. (19II) 20 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 432-437· 
03 I. e., to the exclusion of the rules of the conflict of laws of the foreign 
country. As to "renvoi" see (1910) 10 CoL. .L. REv. 190, 327; (1918) 27 YALE 
LAw JouRNAL, 509; (1919) 29 id. 214; (1918) 31 HARV. L. REv. 523. 
•• See, for example, In re Missouri S. S. Cu. (188g) L. R. 42 Ch. Div. 321; 
Gra1ui v. Livingston (18g6) 4 App. Div. 589. 38 N.Y. Supp. 490; Davis v. Aetna 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (r8gz) 67 N.H. 218, 34 Atl. 464; Cassation, France, (Dec. 5, 
1910), (19II) 7 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRivE, 395· 
""Judge Beach maintains that there is no rational basis· for such a qualification 
as between the different states of our own country. Uniform Interstate Enforce-
ment of Vested Rights (1918) 27 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 656. 
